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Preamble 
 
The issues I want to raise today are at the core of a joint LSE-Columbia research project 
and I should like to urge anyone who is sympathetic with our concerns to join us in that 
project. 
 
 
 
Well-ordered science 
 
 Nick Maxwell has long urged that for science we need not just knowledge but wisdom. 
Recently Phillip Kitcher has been expressing similar concerns in arguing that the most 
important demand we should make of science is not that it be accurate or progressive or 
problem-solving or….whatever are your favourites from the traditional lists of scientific 
virtues. But rather that it be well-ordered, that it answer the right questions in the right 
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ways, where value judgements and methodological issues are inextricably intertwined in 
determining what is right. Kitcher focuses on biomedical research. For instance, he 
objects that we spend too much effort and money trying to develop treatments that will 
make a small marginal difference to the life span and life satisfaction of first-world 
people (though of course perhaps a large difference to any one individual suffering from 
a given problem) at the cost of efforts to develop treatments and preventatives for third-
world problems. 
 
It is important to notice that Kitcher does not urge that ethics alone – or more realistically 
ethics mixed with a huge dose of self-interest – should dictate what questions get 
pursued.  We also need to mix in from the start considerations of what are the right 
methods. For  instance: 
 
• What questions can be reasonably pursued at a given time. He does not for 
instance focus on certain third-world problems just because they affect a huge 
number of people, and more dramatically than even our awful cancers and heart 
diseases affect us, but also because he believes that these problems may be 
improved as a result of research that is neither very costly nor requires great 
imaginative breakthroughs. Developing variations on known treatments and 
vaccines so that they will not require refrigeration is one kind of case here. 
 
• What are the effects of pursuing a given question or given line of research. This 
was the focus of his well-known work on the human genome and the effects the 
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results could have on society given what we know about both our power and our 
political will to guarantee safeguards. 
 
• What methods can get us the kinds of results we are really looking for: exactly 
what can they deliver and at what cost? 
 
It is these last methodologically-oriented issues that I want to direct your attention to. 
Because (i) They are truly pressing and thinking about them in science is often confused 
(or non-existent). (ii)Like most methodological issues in science I am convinced they will 
benefit from the kind of detailed careful attention that we philosophers are trained to 
provide. (iii) We are not providing it.  My aim then is to urge us to direct our efforts away 
from the more abstract questions that usually entertain us – from highly general questions 
of warrant (like: do we have reason to believe our theories are true rather than merely 
empirically adequate; is simplicity a symptom of truth;  the ‘principle principle’; and the 
like) to much more specific questions about particular methods and their problems of 
implementatiuon, their range of validity, their strengths and weaknesses and their costs 
and benefits. 
 
Evidence for use  
 
My own particular concern in this regard right now is with evidence for use. We 
philosophers tend to buy into the Positivist/Popperian picture of exact science, in 
particular into the view that science can and does establish stable unambiguous results, 
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what I think of as “off-the-shelf ” results, results that are warranted and once warranted 
can be put on the shelf to make them generally accessible, from whence they can then be 
taken down and put to various uses in various different circumstances. For large chunks 
of the sciences I know about this is a very mistaken picture of warrant; it is a picture we 
have, I believe, because as philosophers we pay a lot of attention to how scientific claims 
get tested but we pay very little to how they get used. I argue that there is a sense in 
which our scientific claims are not unambiguous: what a claim means in the context in 
which it is first justified may be very different from what it means in the different 
contexts to which it will be put to use. If I am right about this it follows that 
  
What justifies a claim depends on what we are going to do with that claim; 
and evidence for one use may provide no support for others.   
 
Physics is not immune 
 
My own recent concerns about this problem are in the human sciences – economics, other 
social sciences, medicine. But they originated in my work on quantum mechanics, and I 
want to summarize what I noticed there lest we think that the problems are peculiar to the 
sloppy and unregimented studies of society.  
 
I was looking at cases where quantum theory was uncontroversially central to use, in 
particular at the role the theory plays in the treatment of lasers, squids and other 
superconducting devices. My experience was that the quantum mechanics of the laser 
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engineers was a different animal altogether from the quantum mechanics of quantum 
theory. Central ideas and language were shared, modelling techniques, equation forms. 
But in engineering lasers this was so intermixed with specifics that depend on materials 
or that use their own peculiar approximations or import assumptions from other theories 
that even equations that look very much the  same in the two cases were really instead 
more of a pun. Indeed we do not need to go all the way to engineering to see this. The 
work of Sang Wook Yi shows that it is already the case in condensed matter physics, 
which on standard philosophical accounts should just fall under quantum theory. 
 
Let me remind you as well of the work of Peter Galison, who shows for specific cases in 
contemporary physics that experimenters and theoreticians have very different 
understandings of what looks on the face of it to be the same claim. Each implicate the 
claim in a radically different network of inference and assumption, so different that the 
claim must be assigned a different sense for the two groups (which, moreover, are 
obviously not homogeneous within themselves).  
 
If we combine my observations with Galison’s we have a real problem for warrant in the 
use of physics results.  First, it is difficult to see how experiment can warrant a theoretical 
claim, since the theoretical claim both supports and presupposes a very different set of 
inferences than does the experimental. (There’s a vast amount of mathematics in the 
theory that gets no experimental warrant at all.) Then it is equally hard to see how the 
theory can warrant the use. How then can warrant travel from experiment to use? Or does 
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it? And if not, then what? What philosophical account can we offer of the evidence we 
need for the assumptions of quantum mechanics as used and as understood in those uses? 
 
Some examples  
 
Moving away from physics, let me cite some other examples. 
 
• First from philosopher/sociologist of science Jerry Ravetz, who specializes in 
questions of use: We may have excellent evidence, from randomized controlled 
trials even, that a particular fertilizer is both safe and effective. Then we send the 
fertilizer in bags with English-language instructions to a distant country with 
dramatically different geology – say very steep slopes with vast run-off – and no 
culture of fertilizer use. There it is applied just before the huge rains come at 10 or 
12 times the tested doses. The river is poisoned, people grow sick, animals die, 
and no good is done the crops.   
 
This raises a typical problem. Natural science results – like fertilizer effectiveness 
and safety – are warranted by natural science methods. But the implementation of 
those ‘same’ results is seldom a pure natural science process. It involves social 
processes as well, and those need to be understood upfront. The tests cannot 
provide warrant for an ‘off-the-shelf’ result. The result that is warranted by the 
test is not the one we need to know about for use. That result – the one that we 
need to know about the safety and effectiveness of the fertilizer in situ –  will be 
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highly context-dependent, and even knowing what result it is we need to know 
will require a great deal of social science input. 
 
The problem is that we don’t know how to do this. For one, we do not know how 
to include evidence about social processes into decisions that depend heavily on 
natural science. Consider one anecdotal example to make the point.  
 
• The late John Maynard Smith was a brilliant biologist, himself cautious about the 
great boon to our health that is often promised on behalf of the human genome 
project. Asked about designer babies, to the extent that they will be possible, what 
policies and safeguards should be put in place, Maynard Smith replied: Let the 
mother decide. She is the person who has naturally evolved to have the most 
concern for the welfare of the baby. 
 
Maynard Smith’s answer was based on his understanding of natural science. It did 
not occur  to him that for sensible policy we need some understanding of the 
social and political processes: What pressures will mothers be under (eg. If we let 
the mother decide, will that be tantamount to letting the father decide)? What do 
mothers know? Etc. 
 
Worse, Maynard Smith was dismissive about the study of society. In response to a 
different question after the very same talk, he urged, “The very worst thing would 
be to let the social scientists get involved.” He was cheered for this by a number 
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of biologists in the audience – and this despite the fact that the talk was hosted by 
the London School of Economics and Political Science.  
 
Unfortunately I am afraid that our attitude here in the Philosophy of Science 
Association is much like Maynard Smith’s and his biological audience. Science 
faces pressing epistemological questions . Not the ones we usually ask, “What 
warrants a theory”, but rather “What warrants the conclusions we draw on the 
basis of that science in putting it to use?” This is an incredibly hard question 
(probably a great number of questions bundled into one); and it is one which we 
do not have a strong starting position to build from. That is clearly part of the 
reason that so few of us work on the problem – I know I find it very daunting.  
 
But there are other reasons, and one, I believe is Maynard Smith’s: When it comes 
to results that require the input of both natural and social science, we look the 
other way. The social sciences are the poor sister to philosophy of natural science 
– philosophy of physics, philosophy of biology and the logic of statistical 
inference. When we do turn our attention to the social sciences it is economics 
that gets centre place, and even there it is not labour economics, the design of 
measures of poverty, or the kinds of questions George Stiglitz raises in criticizing 
the IMF about the separation of economic science and self interest or the fit of 
universal economic models to highly various local situations. Rather it is the 
upper reaches of game theory and decision theory that take up the bulk of our 
attention. 
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 Besides the problems of integrating – or even obtaining – social science evidence 
from the start, the Jerry Ravetz story about the fertilizer should also remind us 
that we have very little to say about combining evidence at all.  Let me illustrate 
with an example I am now studying. 
 
• British epidemiologist Michael Marmot urges that low status is bad for your 
health and that this is true not just at the bottom end but holds all the way up the 
social gradient. For instance, if you board the tube in central London and go six 
stops east, you lose one year’s life expectancy with each stop.  I want to focus on 
two interconnected issues: 1) How far do/should Marmot’s conclusions stretch: 
For what populations and under what circumstances can we expect his 
conclusions to obtain? And 2) What evidence is relevant to support these 
conclusions? 
 
Marmot himself suggests that the conclusions hold across all situations where low 
socio-economic status leads to increased social isolation and to a particular kind 
of stress (stress due to a combination of low control and high demand). It is 
interesting how he supports this. In his own work he has carried out  detailed 
longitudinal studies across 20 years and more on Whitehall Civil servants, with 
startling results; for instance, the highest paid Whitehall civil servant has twice 
the chance of living to age 60 as the lowest paid. But Marmot also has results 
from interviews and questionnaires on job control and job demand, about the 
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association between laboratory-induced stress and various physiological reactions 
that are thought to increase the chance of stress-related illness, on Whitehall status 
and lifestyle factors connected with illness, such as smoking, obesity, exposure to 
pollution and exercise, and more.  
 
I think we can say (if only we knew how to amalgamate this evidence!) that 
Marmot’s results have a high degree of internal validity: They are very well-
designed and well-controlled to establish just the results he claims. To achieve 
this high standard of internal validity it helps to have a set of cooperating captive 
subjects with known characteristics like Whitehall civil servants. But what about 
external validity: For what other populations can we expect these same 
conclusions to hold? Or, to the point for us: What can we offer on external 
validity? Little I think beyond the truisms that there is generally a trade-off 
between internal and external validity and that the chance of external validity is 
enhanced if the subjects are representative of the target population.  
 
We are pretty good at many questions of internal validity: we argue – and rightly 
so I think – about the real benefits of randomisation in clinical trials, about an 
approach to statistical inference based on Fisher’s ideas vs those of 
Nehman/Pearson, about the causal Markov condition, about whether Holland and 
Rubin are right to justify standard randomised-control-trial techniques on the 
basis of singular counterfactuals. But we have little to say about external validity 
– and that is what matters for use. 
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 The related question is about combining evidence. How does Marmot himself 
support the move from Whitehall civil servants to a far broader population? By 
marshalling a great deal of evidence of different kinds. For instance experiments 
on monkeys that put together the top monkey from a number of different troupes. 
The monkeys again form a hierarchy and the ones at the top are by far the 
healthiest. And, by looking at health data across Canadian provinces. And at what 
happened to health in Russia – especially among Russian men – after the change 
from socialism. And so forth.  
 
Altogether, informally, it is an impressive package. Where will he publish it? That 
helps to make my point – in one of those high-calibre ‘semi-popular’ books. For 
this is not the kind of thing that goes into a serious journal, and in a sense rightly 
so. Even review articles in journals tend to cite studies that have a great deal of 
commonality of language and method – that way they can be adequately policed 
by the experts in the field. That is just the problem. We have no experts on 
combining disparate kinds of evidence (apart from some neat meta-statistical 
techniques, which do not stretch very far). But doing so is at the heart of scientific 
epistemology when that epistemology is directed at establishing results we can 
use.  So we here in this Association should be tackling it. 
  
• We spend a lot of energy and imagination on questions of when we are entitled to 
count a scientific conclusion as true. But we spend little effort in thinking about 
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what truth buys us. Think about causal modelling in political economy. As John 
Stuart Mill stressed, the causes operating in the economy change frequently and 
usually unpredictably. So, as econometrician David Hendry argues in recent work 
on forecasting, even a very accurate causal model cannot be relied on to forecast 
correctly. The best evidence for the truth of the model is not good evidence for its 
forecasts. 
 
This is the same kind of conclusion that social-psychologist Gerd Gigerenzer 
urges when he talks about ‘cheap heuristics that make us rich’. Gigerenzer 
illustrates with the heuristic by which we catch a ball in the air. We run after it, 
always keeping the angle between our line of sight and the ball constant. We thus 
achieve pretty much the same result as if we had done the impossible – rapidly 
collected an indefinite amount of data on everything affecting the ball’s flight and 
calculated its trajectory from Newton’s laws. 
 
The point about cheap heuristics is that they are not anything like the ‘true’ 
account. They are not approximations to it nor idealizations from it; they do not, 
as many anti-realists (eg. constructive empiricists, NOA-ers, …) demand of 
‘good’ theory, have all the virtues of truth just failing truth (or good grounds for 
it); they do not improve by adding more realistic assumptions (to the contrary, this 
usually undermines the ‘trick’ by which they work in the first place); and so forth. 
This puts them entirely outside our usual debate. But cheap heuristics are crucial 
for practice. What evidence is necessary to justify the use of a conclusion derived 
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from a cheap heuristic? Must we first have the ‘true’ model and then show that 
the results converge often enough? Or,….  Again, these are key questions in 
scientific epistemology as soon as we stop focussing on theory and turn to use. 
We should be working on them. 
 
• There is one area of use in which we philosophers of science are doing good 
detailed work at the moment – methods of causal inference. But I would like to 
close by suggesting ways in which we should be stretching this work. We have on 
offer right now a lot of alternative accounts of what causality consists in: 
probabilistic theories of causality, invariance accounts, manipulation theories, 
causal process theories, and so on. Each, it turns out, is closely associated with 
one or another well-known method for establishing causal conclusions: tests for 
Granger causality, stability tests, controlled experiments, identifying causal 
mechanisms,… 
 
We put a lot of energy into trying to figure out which of these accounts of 
causality is correct. I would like to see us divert some of that energy to a more 
refined question:  
 
Which account – with its concomitant method – is right for which 
kind of system in which kinds of circumstances?  
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When we can answer that we will know about the proper use of the different 
associated methods.  
 
The currently fashionable Bayes-nets methods are doing better than most in this 
regard. For they lay down three assumptions about causality, then show that 
anytime causes meet these three conditions, their methods will not give erroneous 
results (though they may often yield no results at all) if the input information on 
the probabilities is correct.  
 
This is a good start. But it does not go far enough. What are these three 
assumptions? So-called ‘faithfulness’, the ‘causal Markov condition’, and 
‘minimality’. And what does all that mean? I can write them out for you (many of 
you know them already) and you will understand them – in a sense. But what I 
write will not help a practicing scientist. What do these conditions amount to in 
the real world? Are there any even rough identifying features a system may have 
that will give us a clue that it is faithful or satisfies causal Markov or minimality? 
Bayes-nets experts are very good at proving theorems. They are also, many of 
them. getting good at what turns out to be the terribly complicated and subtle 
matter of applying the methods in real cases. But little is done on criteria in more 
concrete terms of when to apply these methods. And our other accounts of 
causality lag far behind Bayes-nets in this regard. They shouldn’t. 
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 Conclusion   
 
We ought to aim for a well-ordered science. That involves a number of different issues to 
which philosophy of science can – and should – contribute. The ones I have focussed on 
involve questions of warrant and evidence. Most of our work on warrant in the 
Philosophy of Science Association is still fixated on theory. If we want to contribute to a 
well-ordered science that answers the right questions in the right way, we need to shift 
our emphasis and work instead on questions of evidence for use.   
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